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THE ROLE ACCORDED TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN SECURITY COUNCIL MARITIME RESOLUTIONS
Anna Petrig*
Introduction: What possible roles for human rights in maritime security 
resolutions? – I. Are human rights violations occurring at sea a threat to 
the peace? – II. Human rights of suspects: from initial silence to a referen-
tial approach – A. Authorized enforcement measures and their potential 
to infringe human rights – B. Initial silence on compliance of enforcement 
measures with human rights – C. Mooring authorized enforcement powers 
to human rights law – D. The reference to ‘applicable’ international human 
rights law is loaded with uncertainty – 1. Simultaneous reference to inter-
national humanitarian law – 2. Extraterritorial application of human rights 
in the maritime context – 3. Permissibility and justification for modified 
maritime standards – E. The referential approach: any added value or pure 
symbolism? – III. Human rights of victims: a mirroring approach – A. UN 
Protocols on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: following a rights-
based approach – B. Legal instruments on the suppression of piracy: lacking 
a human rights dimension – C. Maritime resolutions reflect the lex lata – IV. 
Conclusion: why no bolder role?
Introduction: What possible roles for human rights in maritime security 
resolutions?
If we consider the role the United Nations Security Council has 
played in the field of maritime safety and security throughout its exis-
tence, the last ten years are of particular interest. Over the past decade, 
the number of resolutions with maritime safety and security at their core 
has increased dramatically,1 and this development fits perfectly into the 
*  Anna Petrig is Professor of International Law and Public Law at the Univer-
sity of Basel in Switzerland. She would like to thank Maria Orchard, J.D./LL.M., for 
her invaluable research assistance and discussions on the topic of victims of crimes 
under international law. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 The first resolution having Somali piracy at its core was UNSC Res 1816 (2 
June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1816, which was followed by more than a dozen reso-
lutions, the latest being UNSC Res 2383 (7 November 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2383. 
The Security Council also issued resolutions pertaining to piracy in the Gulf of 
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broader picture of international security. The concept of maritime se-
curity began to emerge as a result of the maritime terrorism incidents 
that took place in the wake of 9/11,2 and the rise of Somali-based piracy 
after 2006 ultimately brought it to the forefront. The adoption of mari-
time security strategies by various actors in recent years reflects how the 
maritime dimension of security has risen in rank on security agendas,3 
including that of the United Nations. In its 2008 Report on Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea, the Secretary General identified seven specific threats 
to maritime security4 – and the Security Council took a particularly active 
Guinea, albeit not using its Chapter VII powers: UNSC Res 2018 (31 October 
2011) UN Doc S/RES/2018, followed by UNSC Res 2039 (29 February 2012) UN 
Doc S/RES/2039. With UNSC Res 2240 (9 October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2240, 
the Council issued its first resolution on human trafficking and migrant smuggling 
into, through and from Libya, which was recently renewed for the second time with 
UNSC Res 2380 (5 October 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2380. As regards the enforce-
ment of embargos through the authorization of maritime interdiction operations, the 
Security Council issued resolutions in rather regular intervals since the 1990s (for an 
overview, see Magne Frostad, ‘United Nations Authorized Embargos and Maritime 
Interdiction: A Special Focus on Somalia’ in Gemma Andreone (ed), The Future of 
the Law of the Sea: Bridging Gaps Between National, Individual and Common Inter-
ests (Springer 2017) 214-17). However, in more recent resolutions, the readiness to 
deviate from the jurisdictional rules under the law of the sea increased; UNSC Res 
2182 (21 October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2182 and UNSC Res 2292 (14 June 2016) 
UN Doc S/RES/2292, e.g., no longer require flag state consent for the inspection of 
suspicious ships on the high seas but simply ‘good-faith efforts’ to obtain flag state 
consent.
2 For a brief overview on incidents, see Patricia Schneider, ‘Maritime Terrorism: 
Governance and Non-State Actors’ in Anja P. Jakobi and Klaus Dieter Wolf (eds), 
The Transnational Governance of Violence and Crime Non-State Actors in Security 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 172; Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the 
Sea (OUP 2011) 148-49.
3 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, ‘Beyond seablindness: A new agen-
da for maritime security studies’ (2017) 93(6) International Affairs 1293, 1294 and 
1297-98, mention the adoption of maritime strategies by various states (US, UK, 
France and India) and international actors, notably the EU Maritime Security Strat-
egy (2014), NATO’s Alliance Maritime Strategy (2011), the G7 declaration on mari-
time security, Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2014) and Charter on Maritime 
Security, Safety and Development (2016).
4 UNGA, ‘Oceans and the law of the sea: Report of the Secretary-General’ 
(2008) UN Doc A/63/63, paras 54-113: piracy and armed robbery; terrorist acts 
involving shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests; illicit traffick-
ing in arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMD); illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances; smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea; illegal, 
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role, granting enforcement powers to states that go beyond those gener-
ally available under the international law of the sea in three areas: piracy 
and armed robbery at sea, human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, 
and enforcement of embargos relating to arms and weapons of mass de-
struction and other objects, such as Somali charcoal. These resolutions 
are referred to as ‘maritime resolutions’ in the following.
The contribution at hand analyses these maritime resolutions from 
a human rights perspective specifically, and thus involves an examina-
tion of the role the Security Council accords to human rights in these 
maritime resolutions. Put differently, for what purpose does the Security 
Council refer to and invoke human rights, and how much weight does it 
confer to human rights in the context of maritime security? The analysis 
proceeds in three steps. 
Since the bulk of maritime resolutions have been adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, this contribution first addresses whether 
the Security Council has ever qualified human rights violations occurring 
at sea as ‘a threat to the peace’ – the most widely invoked reason for 
triggering its Chapter VII powers.5 It will be concluded that the Security 
Council has not. This is due to the obvious reason that maritime resolu-
tions, which deal with either criminal phenomena (piracy and armed rob-
bery at sea as well as human trafficking and migrant smuggling) or illegal 
acts at sea (embargo violations), centre on criminal conduct by private 
individuals – that is, conduct that violates individual interests rather than 
human rights (Part I). 
Given that maritime resolutions deal with the suppression of crimi-
nality at sea, it is necessary to then ask, as a second step, whether the Se-
curity Council refers to human rights as strictures on the exercise of the 
enforcement measures it authorizes (such as arrest, detention, and trans-
fer of suspects; or seizure and disposal of corpora delicti or paraphernalia 
to commit the offence). Hence, the focus is on the traditional dimension 
of human rights, which are negative obligations requiring states not to 
unreported and unregulated fishing; and intentional and unlawful damage to the 
marine environment.
5 Nico Krisch, ‘Article 39’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The United Na-
tions Charter: A Commentary, vol II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1278, MN 12 (‘Threat to 
the peace is the broadest, most indistinct, but also the most important concept in 
Art. 39. In practice, it is almost the only one used by the SC; the Council usually does 
not explicitly determine breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.’). 
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interfere with the exercise of rights.6 It will be demonstrated that early 
maritime resolutions are silent on human rights as a means of confining 
the enforcement powers authorized by the Security Council, and only 
later did it start mooring authorizations of enforcement measures with 
human rights. However, thus far, the Council has only referred to ‘appli-
cable’ international human rights law and has therefore pursued a purely 
referential approach. This approach is problematic because of the intri-
cacies surrounding whether, under what conditions, and to what extent 
human rights apply in at-sea enforcement scenarios (Part II).
As a last step, the analysis turns to victims of criminality at sea ad-
dressed by the maritime resolutions. At the example of assistance to vic-
tims, it analyses the stance taken by the Security Council, if any, vis-à-vis 
positive human rights obligations – that is, the layer that imposes a duty 
on the state to take action.7 The analysis finds that the Security Coun-
cil takes a mirroring approach: the bolder and more established specific 
victims’ rights are under international (human rights) law, the firmer its 
references to states’ (legal) obligations to assist victims of maritime crim-
inality (Part III).
This contribution will conclude that the Security Council has shown 
much reluctance in its maritime resolutions and thus consider why the 
Security Council’s engagement in terms of the human rights of suspects 
and victims of maritime criminality is not bolder; and why the Council 
simply references or mirrors the applicable law – instead of setting its 
own standard (Part IV).
I. Are human rights violations occurring at sea a threat to the peace?
The bulk of maritime resolutions have been adopted under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, which leads to an inquiry of whether the Secu-
rity Council has referred to human rights violations occurring a sea to 
substantiate that a ‘threat to the peace’ exists. The idea that not only a 
6 Dinah Shelton and Ariel Gould, ‘Positive and Negative Obligations’ in Dinah 
Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 
562-63.
7 ibid; Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, ‘Positive obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A guide to the implementation of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights’ (CoE Human Rights Handbooks No. 7, 2007) 5 and 11.
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(potential) violation of state interests, but also of individual rights, may 
trigger the enforcement powers of the Security Council was already being 
discussed during the drafting of the UN Charter. France proposed to an-
chor, in what is currently Chapter VII, the statement that ‘the clear viola-
tion of essential liberties and of human rights constitutes in itself a threat 
capable of compromising peace’.8 This avant-garde position did not gain 
a majority of votes at the time, but it found a partial break-through in 
the post-Cold War practice of the Security Council, which exhibited in-
creased readiness to expand the concept of ‘threat to the peace’ beyond 
classical state security threats to threats endangering human security.9 
Yet, absent (the risk of) an armed conflict, the Security Council has been 
reluctant to qualify human rights violations as a threat to peace.10 
Even if the Security Council were ready to qualify (massive) human 
rights violations as a threat to peace, this would be irrelevant for the 
maritime resolutions under consideration here because the conduct 
threatening individual security does not emanate from state actors but 
rather from private actors – ‘pirates’, ‘traffickers’, ‘smugglers’ and other 
criminals – and they cannot commit human rights violations as such. As 
an obvious consequence, the Security Council does not have recourse to 
human rights in order to justify that there is a threat to the peace in the 
sense of Article 39 UN Charter. 
However, it is worth noting here that the violation of individual inter-
ests plays (an increasingly) important role for triggering the application 
of Chapter VII in the context of maritime security: in Resolution 2240 
(2015), the Security Council qualified a criminal phenomenon in itself 
as a threat to the peace when ‘[a]ffirming the necessity to put an end to 
the recent proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling 
of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the 
coast of Libya, and, for these specific purposes, acting under Chapter 
8 ‘Summary Report of Sixteenth Meeting of Committee I/1’ (14 June 1945) Doc 
976, I/1/40, in Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organ-
ization, Vol VI (1945) 498.
9 Krisch (n 5) 1278-91, MN 12-34.
10 ibid 1284, MN 22 (‘If the protection of State security was long seen as the 
core of the UN’s collective security system, the protection of individuals has increas-
ingly emerged as an additional goal.’), and 1287, MN 27 (‘UN practice so far does 
not reflect a sufficiently broad consensus to extend the notion of a threat to the peace 
to grave violations of HR as such, in the absence of the risk of armed conflict.’).
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VII of the Charter of the United Nations’.11 Arguably, the fact that the 
criminal conduct ‘endangers the lives of thousands of people’12 may have 
been decisive in the Council’s decision to qualify it as a threat to the 
peace. With this resolution, the Council went beyond its approach in the 
context of Somali-based piracy where the state-centric view still domi-
nated and piracy was seen as a factor contributing to the instability in 
Somalia – that is, the criminal phenomenon in itself (and its negative 
impact on seafarers) did not amount to a threat to the peace.13 Rather, the 
interests of (potential) victims of a criminal phenomenon only emerged 
as a threat to the peace with Resolution 2240 on human trafficking and 
migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean. Whether this resolution is an 
isolated occurrence or the start of an emergent pattern of considering 
private criminal conduct as a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39 
UN Charter remains to be seen.14 
II. Human rights of suspects: from initial silence to a referential approach
In light of the traditional function of human rights as a constraint on 
state action – notably in the field of law enforcement – the following sec-
tions analyse whether and how the Security Council has made reference 
to human rights as a limitation of the enforcement action it authorizes in 
its maritime resolutions. 
11 UNSC Res 2240, preambular para 14.
12 UNSC Res 2240, para 1.
13 See UNSC Res 1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846, preambular 
para 14: ‘Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels 
in the territorial waters of Somalia and the high seas off the coast of Somalia exacer-
bate the situation in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security in the region’; and recently UNSC Res 2383, preambular para 34: 
‘Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of 
Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor 
exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to inter-
national peace and security in the region’.
14 Kiara Neri, L’emploi de la force en mer (Bruylant 2013) 230, correctly notes 
that ‘la nature du système collective semble, en théorie, faire obstacle à son dé-
clenchement pour régir et réagir (à) un acte illicite perpétré par une personne privée. 
La question de qualification est alors délicate.’
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A. Authorized enforcement measures and their potential to infringe 
human rights
Without going into explicit detail here, it suffices to recall that the 
Security Council has authorized states and regional organizations to take 
enforcement measures that go beyond what is generally available under 
the international law of the sea. It has done so for different maritime 
zones (namely territorial waters and the high seas) and thereby deviat-
ed in varying degrees from the ordinarily applicable jurisdictional rules 
(notably as regards the foregoing of consent of the generally competent 
state).15 Depending on the type of illegal conduct to counter, the Security 
Council has allowed for different types of enforcement measures. In the 
field of embargo enforcement, it has generally authorized the inspection 
of vessels to ascertain whether they carry prohibited cargo, the collection 
of evidence related to the carriage of prohibited cargo in the course of 
such inspections, and the seizure and disposal of items covered by the re-
spective embargo.16 In resolutions aimed at the suppression of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea, the Council has not explicitly named the different 
types of enforcement measures but has rather referred to those available 
under the law of the sea (most notably under the UNCLOS) to counter 
piracy on the high seas – which are primarily arrest, detention, and trans-
fer for prosecution of suspects.17 For countering human trafficking and 
migrant smuggling, the Council has authorized the inspection of vessels 
suspected of engaging in these offences, and the seizure and disposal 
15 As regards piracy, e.g., the Security Council authorized with UNSC Res 1846 
and successor resolutions to take enforcement measures in the territorial waters of 
Somalia (para 10); and stressed that the consent of the Somali Transitional Federal 
Government has been obtained by the TFG. In order to suppress human trafficking 
and migrant smuggling, the Council authorized states and regional organizations 
with UNSC Res 2240, para 9, to inspect suspicious vessels on the high, provided that 
the intercepting state or regional organization has made good faith efforts to obtain 
the consent of the vessel’s flag state prior to using this authority. In UNSC Res 2182, 
it authorized inspections of ships in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas off 
the coast of Somalia suspected of breaching the arms and charcoal embargo (para 
15), and requested Member States to make good faith efforts to first seek the consent 
of the vessel’s flag State (para 16).
16 See, e.g., UNSC Res 2182, paras 15 and 17.
17 UNSC Res 1846, para 10; see Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed 
Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and 
the Gulf of Aden (OUP 2011) 77-78.
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of vessels where such suspicion was confirmed.18 In order to carry out 
these different types of enforcement measures, the Security Council gen-
erally allows using ‘all necessary means’19 or ‘all measures commensurate 
to the specific circumstances’ to carry out the respective enforcement 
measures20 – thus adopting so-called robust mandates to enforce the law 
at sea.
It is stating the obvious that in the exercise of these enforcement 
powers, the human rights of persons they are directed at – that is, per-
sons suspected of engaging in the respective illegal conduct – may be 
violated. In addition, the human rights of third persons may be at stake, 
be it persons who are in the vicinity of the enforcement theatre, such as 
fishermen,21 or persons who have a legal link with the object of the en-
forcement measures, such as owners of inspected vessels.22 
Looking at the different phases of maritime law enforcement oper-
ations, the following rights, inter alia, may be at stake: prior to interdic-
tion, intelligence measures taken to collect information must be consid-
ered in light of the right to private life; during interdiction, when gaining 
access to the ship and its cargo (by potentially using force), the right to 
property, the right life and physical integrity become relevant. Ultimately, 
upon boarding – when searches, arrest and transfers of persons occur – 
yet another set of rights must be considered, notably the right to liberty, 
various procedural safeguards, and the prohibition of refoulement; and if 
the cargo and/or vessel is destroyed or disposed of in another way (e.g. 
sold), the right to property attaches.23
18 UNSC Res 2240, paras 7 and 8.
19 UNSC Res 1846, para 10(b).
20 In relation to inspections: UNSC Res 2292, para 4; UNSC Res 2146 (19 
March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2146, para 5. UNSC Res 2182, para 16, reads slightly 
different: ‘all necessary measures commensurate with the circumstances to carry out 
such inspections’.
21 E.g. UNSC Res 2312 (6 October 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2312, para 12, where 
the Security Council urges the enforcers ‘to have due regard for the livelihoods of 
those engaged in fishing or other legitimate activity’.
22 E.g. UNSC Res 2240, para 8 where the Security Council ‘underscores that 
further action with regard to such vessels inspected (...), including disposal, will be 
taken in accordance with applicable international law with due consideration of the 
interests of any third parties who have acted in good faith’. 
23 Dimitrios Batsalas, ‘Maritime Interdiction and Human Rights’ in Efthymios 
D. Papastavridis and Kimberley N. Trapp (eds), La criminalité en mer / Crimes at sea 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2014) 437-50.
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B. Initial silence on compliance of enforcement measures with human 
rights
Given the rather broad enforcement powers authorized by the Secu-
rity Council in its maritime resolutions and their potential to encroach 
upon various human rights, it is necessary to ask whether and to what 
extent the Council has invoked human rights as a stricture – a garde-fou 
– on the exercise of these powers. If we were to look at maritime reso-
lutions on a timeline, it comes into view that today the Security Council 
is more inclined to make a reference to international law in general or 
human rights law specifically than it has been in the past. 
The Security Council’s early authorizations of maritime interdiction 
operations to enforce embargos were not limited in any way. This holds 
true, for example, in the case of Resolution 665 (1990) on the enforce-
ment of the oil embargo imposed on Iraq following its occupation of Ku-
wait. In this resolution, the Council authorized states deploying maritime 
forces to the area ‘to use such measures commensurate to the specific 
circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Securi-
ty Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping’.24 Other 
embargo enforcement authorizations issued by the Council in the 1990s 
contain similar language and do not restrict the broad enforcement pow-
ers in any way.25 Yet, with Resolution 1132 (1997), the Security Council 
authorized ECOWAS to ensure strict implementation of the embargo 
against Sierra Leone ‘including, where necessary and in conformity with 
applicable international standards, by halting inward maritime ship-
ping’.26 However, the reference to ‘international standards’ is arguably 
not one to international human rights law. Rather, the Council seems to 
refer to general principles of international law limiting the use of force, 
such as proportionality. Such a reading is supported by the fact that the 
Security Council mentions in the same breath the principle of necessity, 
which is another cardinal principle limiting the use of force.27 
24 UNSC Res 665 (25 August 1990) para 1.
25 See UNSC Res 875 (16 October 1993) UN Doc S/RES/875, para 1, concerning 
the situation in Haiti; UNSC Res 787 (16 November 1992) UN Doc S/RES/787, para 
12, concerning the situation in situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
26 UNSC Res 1132 (8 October 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1132, para 8.
27 M/V ‘Saiga’ (No 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) (Judgment of 
1 July 1999) ITLOS Reports 1999, para 155.
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Moreover, the Security Council’s authorizations of measures to con-
tain the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons have 
not been accompanied by a reference to international human rights law. 
For example, in Resolution 1874 (2009), the authorization to seize and 
dispose of items violating the embargo, which notably encompasses ma-
terials and technologies that could contribute to North Korea’s WMD 
programmes, was not accompanied by a reference to international law in 
general or international human rights law specifically.28
Finally, the initial authorization contained in Resolution 1846 (2008) 
to use ‘all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery 
at sea’ within Somali territorial waters did not refer to human rights as 
a stricture on enforcement action.29 The reference to use all necessary 
means ‘in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high sea 
with respect to piracy under relevant international law’ only imposes a 
limitation on the types of enforcement measures allowed (i.e. those avail-
able under UNCLOS),30 not how they are to be exercised (i.e. in respect 
of human rights).31 While the Security Council did not tie up the autho-
rizations granted by Resolution 1846 with a reference to human rights, it 
requested states contributing to the counter-piracy efforts by deploying 
forces to ensure that their activities ‘do not have the practical effect of 
denying or impairing the rights of innocent passage to the ships of any 
third State’.32 In its subsequent resolutions, the Security Council sim-
ply renewed the authorizations granted under Resolution 1846 without, 
28 UNSC Res 1874 (12 June 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1874, para 14.
29 UNSC Res 1846, para 10(b). 
30 Geiss and Petrig (n 17) 77-78.
31 The same holds true for the reference to ‘relevant international law’ in UNSC 
Res 1846, para 9, which calls upon states to only take such enforcement measures 
that are authorized under the resolution or by international law; hence, the reference 
to international law pertains to the types of enforcement measures allowed rather 
than how force is used when taking them; see similar call in UNSC Res 2383, para 
12. The reference to UNCLOS in the preamble of UNSC Res 1846 does not alter 
the finding that the Security Council is silent as regards compliance of enforcement 
measures with international human rights law because the counter-piracy provisions 
of UNCLOS (Arts 101-107) do not feature a human rights dimension: see Irini Pa-
panicolopulu, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention: No Place for Persons?’ (2012) 27 
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 867; and Anna Petrig, Human 
Rights and Law Enforcement at Sea: Arrest, Detention and Transfer of Piracy Suspects 
(Brill Nijhoff 2014) 225. 
32 UNSC Res 1846, para 13.
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however, mooring the enforcement powers to a request that they con-
form with human rights law. Meanwhile, the request not to disturb inno-
cent passage continued to appear in all successor resolutions. Hence, the 
focus is on the free flow of movement, rather than the individual rights of 
persons subjected to enforcement measures.33
C. Mooring authorized enforcement powers to human rights law
In some fields, not only was the Security Council initially silent in 
terms of human rights as a stricture on enforcement authorizations, but it 
continued to be in later resolutions renewing (and, at times, expanding) 
these authorizations. As previously shown, this holds true for counter-pi-
racy resolutions as well as the various resolutions conferring powers to 
implement the sanctions against North Korea, including the most recent, 
adopted in September 2017.34 
However, in several newer resolutions, the Security Council moored 
the permission to take certain measures with strictures of a different 
type. In its resolutions on human trafficking and smuggling of migrants 
into, through and from the Libyan territory, the Security Council au-
thorized states and regional organizations to inspect suspicious vessels 
on the high seas off the coast of Libya.35 In addition, it empowered 
them to seize such vessels and underscored ‘that further action with re-
gard to such vessels inspected (…), including disposal, will be taken in 
accordance with applicable international law with due considerations 
of the interests of any third parties who have acted in good faith’.36 On 
the one hand, this restriction, which only pertains to inspected vessels, 
is broader than a reference to human rights law because it references 
international law in general; on the other hand, it is partly non-legal be-
cause it refers to ‘interests’ rather than ‘rights’ of persons. The Security 
Council further dispels any doubt that human rights law shall limit the 
granted enforcement powers when it authorizes ‘to use all measures 
commensurate to the specific circumstances in confronting migrant 
smugglers or human traffickers in carrying out activities under para-
33 See, e.g., the latest counter-piracy resolution: UNSC Res 2383, paras 14 and 17. 
34 UNSC Res 2375 (11 September 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2375, para 22.
35 UNSC Res 2240, para 7.
36 UNSC Res 2240, para 8.
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graphs 7 and 8 and in full compliance with international human rights 
law, as applicable’.37 
Similarly, recent embargo enforcement authorizations have entailed 
a reference to bodies of law limiting enforcement powers. In Resolution 
2182 (2014), the Security Council authorized the inspection of specific 
vessels in order to implement the arms embargo and charcoal ban im-
posed on Somalia.38 It allowed states conducting such inspections ‘to use 
all necessary measures commensurate with international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law, as may be applicable’ and urged 
Member State doing so ‘without causing undue delay to or undue inter-
ference with the exercise of the right of innocent passage or freedom of 
navigation’.39 Yet, the Council did not attach a reference to human rights 
to the authorizations to seize and dispose of items identified during such 
inspections, instead imposing another stricture by requesting that that 
seized charcoal, weapons or military equipment is disposed ‘in an envi-
ronmentally responsible manner’.40 
With Resolution 2292 (2016), the Security Council allowed for the 
inspection of vessels suspected of breaching the arms embargo on the 
high seas without prior consent.41 It authorized states ‘to use all mea-
sures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such in-
spections, in full compliance with international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law, as applicable’ and urged them ‘to do so 
without causing undue delay to or undue interference with the exercise 
of freedom of navigation’.42 Meanwhile, the Council did not limit the 
37 UNSC Res 2240, para 10. The Security Council in UNSC Res 2312, para 7, 
not only renews the authorizations for another year but also ‘otherwise reiterates 
the content’ of these authorization paragraphs, i.e. endorses mentioned strictures; it 
follows the same approach in UNSC Res 2380.
38 UNSC Res 2182, para 15. 
39 UNSC Res 2182, para 16. In UNSC Res 2317 (10 November 2016) UN Doc 
S/RES/2317, para 25, the Security Council decided ‘to renew the provisions set out 
in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2017’, i.e. the author-
izations, but did not so for UNSC Res 2182, para 16, which contains the reference 
to international human rights law. However, this is arguably not necessary because 
paragraph 16 was not limited in time as was paragraph 15.
40 UNSC Res 2182, para 19.
41 Rather, as per UNSC Res 2292, para 3, it suffices to ‘make good-faith efforts 
to first obtain the consent of the vessel’s flag State prior to any inspections’; if these 
efforts remain unsuccessful, the interdicting vessel can proceed.
42 UNSC Res 2292, para 4.
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authorization to seize and dispose of prohibited items and to collect evi-
dence in the course of inspections, but it did urge states engaged in such 
activities ‘to avoid causing harm to the marine environment or to the 
safety of navigation’.43 
What emerges from these examples is that, on the one hand, the Se-
curity Council requests respect for core concerns of the law of the sea 
– freedom of navigation, innocent passage and safety of navigation – and 
the protection of the marine environment when enforcing the law at sea, 
without, however, clearly specifying the legal bases protecting these in-
terests. On the other hand, the Council refers to various bodies of law 
limiting enforcement action: international law, human rights law, and in-
cluding at times a reference to international humanitarian law. Not only 
does the Security Council refer to different sources, but it does so in a 
rather arbitrary manner.44 Despite this variability in terms of when and 
what legal strictures are referenced, one consistency remains: in all the 
maritime resolutions, the Security Council refers to the ‘applicable’ law. 
Yet the Council does not identify what the applicable law is, let alone set 
a standard, thus pursuing a (patchy) referential approach. 
D. The reference to ‘applicable’ international human rights law is 
loaded with uncertainty
This referential approach is problematic because of the intricacies 
surrounding whether, under what conditions, and to what extent human 
rights apply in at-sea enforcement scenarios. In short, it is far from clear 
what the ‘applicable’ international human rights law is in the context of 
enforcement action at sea, and thus the following discusses some of the 
factors contributing to this uncertainty. 
1. Simultaneous reference to international humanitarian law
The first uncertainty stems from the fact that, in various resolutions, 
the Security Council not only requests full compliance with applicable 
international human rights law but also with applicable international hu-
43 UNSC Res 2292, para 5.
44 See the examples of UNSC Res 2292 and UNSC Res 2182 above where the 
power to inspect, but not the power to seize and dispose and to collect evidence were 
accompanied by such limitation.
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manitarian law (IHL). The relationship between these two bodies of law, 
which is vividly discussed in doctrine45 and the subject of a growing body 
of case law,46 is complex and multifarious. Yet, one thing can be said with 
certainty: in specific situations, IHL norms will take precedence as the 
lex specialis over international human rights law and thus set aside more 
protective norms of this body of law – such as those regarding the use of 
force, which is regulated differently under human rights law and IHL. 
In the respective maritime resolutions, the Security Council does not 
specifically state that IHL applies to the situation under consideration, 
instead insinuating the potential applicability of IHL. The resolutions 
containing such reference to IHL pertain to states with ongoing armed 
conflicts: Somalia and Libya. However, this in itself does not suffice to 
subject enforcement measures to IHL; rather, it would be necessary that 
the enforcers are a party to the armed conflict in question and that the 
measures taken feature a link with the armed conflict. This is neither the 
case for enforcement measures aimed at suppressing Somali piracy,47 nor 
for the enforcement of the embargo taken vis-à-vis Somalia and Libya 
respectively.48 It can only be speculated why the Security Council never-
theless chose to refer to IHL in these resolutions. Arguably, the intention 
was simply to emphasise that certain legal strictures attach when acting 
upon its authorizations. Yet, references to IHL are unfortunate in the 
contexts at hand because they unnecessarily spread doubts about the role 
to be accorded to international human rights law when taking enforce-
ment action at sea.
2. Extraterritorial application of human rights in the maritime context
Even if the Security Council only refers to applicable international 
45 See, e.g., Robert Kolb and Richard Hyde, An Introduction to the International 
Law of Armed Conflicts (Hart Publishing 2008) 269-74.
46 See, e.g., Banković v Belgium and Others App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 De-
cember 2001) and Hassan v United Kingdom App no 29750/09 (ECtHR, 16 Septem-
ber 2014).
47 UNSC Res 1851 (16 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1851, para 6, con-
tained such simultaneous reference to IHL and IHRL; see Geiss and Petrig (n 17) 
132-36, on why IHL in not applicable when countering Somali-based piracy (on land 
and at sea).
48 On the unnecessary reference to IHL in UNSC Res 2182 pertaining to the 
enforcement of the embargo against Somalia, see Frostad (n 1) 226.
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human rights law (without mentioning IHL), a number of questions re-
main, one of which pertains to the extraterritorial application of human 
rights. Enforcement measures are taken extraterritorially, both in the le-
gal and metaphorical sense. The bulk of maritime enforcement measures 
are taken in an area either under no jurisdiction (the high seas) or under 
the jurisdiction of a third state (e.g. in a third state’s territorial waters), 
and thus, from an enforcer’s perspective, extraterritorially in the legal 
sense. Also metaphorically speaking, the enforcement takes place outside 
the territory – that is, at sea – which adds to the legal complexity because 
the requirements for the extraterritorial application of human rights in 
the maritime context specifically is much less developed as compared to 
operations of states on foreign soil. 
The question whether human rights law applies extraterritorially can 
be answered in a fairly straightforward manner if enforcement measures 
are carried out on board a warship or state ship, such as in the case of de-
tention. In this situation, human rights (being a component of the state’s 
legal order) apply by virtue of the flag State principle. When intercepting 
a ship (which may necessitate the use of force) or when taking enforce-
ment measures on board a foreign ship (e.g. inspecting it), however, the 
jurisdictional link necessary to trigger the application of human rights 
must be found elsewhere. The obvious starting point is the criteria de-
veloped for at-land scenarios, which are effective control over persons 
and territory.49 Yet, their transposition to the at-sea context is far from 
clear and the corpus of judicial pronouncement on the matter remains 
limited.50 We are thus left with two open questions: Does the concept of 
‘control over territory’ imply control over a vessel, the operational radius 
of a warship, or a densely-patrolled area in law enforcement operations at 
sea? Is ‘control over persons’ more easily established at sea where escape 
is virtually impossible? 
The extraterritorial application of human rights in the maritime con-
text has, thus far, mainly been established on an ex post case-by-case basis 
49 For the ECHR specifically, see William A. Schabas, The European Convention 
on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 100-04.
50 In recent years, the amount of scholarship on the issue has grown: see, e.g., 
Batsalas (n 23) 432-38; Kiara Neri, ‘The Applicability of the European Convention 
on Human Rights to State Enforcement and Control at Sea’ in Gemma Andreone 
(ed), Jurisdiction and Control at Sea: Some Environmental and Security Issues (Gi-
annini Editore 2014) 155-61; Petrig (n 31) 139-46. 
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– most notably in the context of liability – rather than in a general and 
abstract way. A more pronounced statement of the Security Council that 
international human rights law actually applies (extraterritorially) rather 
than a mere reference to the applicable law, would certainly help states 
engaged in law enforcement operations abroad to determine the stan-
dards by which they have to abide. In addition, such a statement would 
allow overcoming the patchy protection that results from the current ap-
plication of the various effective control-criteria. In short, it would help 
realize the underlying idea of human rights law: that state power – against 
whomever, in whatever form and circumstances it is exercised – is not 
unlimited. 
3. Permissibility and justification for modified maritime standards
Once it is established that a specific instrument of international hu-
man rights law applies extraterritorially, another question ensues: Can 
the substance of specific rights be adapted to the specificities of the 
maritime environment? That is, can a standard be lowered because the 
specific right is being applied at sea? And what justifies such a modifi-
cation?
The discussion on the right of piracy suspects to be brought promptly 
before a judge is exemplary in this respect, from which various questions 
arise: Can the deadlines be exceptionally longer than those developed for 
law enforcement at land? Must the person be brought before a judge in 
person or does it exceptionally suffice to establish contact by means of 
video-link or even to rely on a written procedure? And is the obligation 
incumbent on the arresting state or the state to which the person is trans-
ferred for proceedings?51 When answering these types of questions, the 
main difficulty lies in drawing the following line: Is full protection not 
granted due to a lack of willingness and/or absent arrangements (ranging 
from putting in place the respective legal bases to equipping ships ac-
cordingly)? Or is a lower standard unavoidable because of the specifici-
ties of the operational environment? The example of France, to which we 
will turn at the end of this contribution,52 illustrates that a human-rights 
based approach to arrest and detention of piracy suspects is feasible. 
51 In detail, see Petrig (n 31) 265-87.
52 See below, text relating to n 99-101.
THE PLACE ACCORDED TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN SECURITY COUNCIL 59
Already in 2011, the Security Council53 invited states ‘to examine their 
domestic legal frameworks for detention at sea of suspected pirates to 
ensure that their laws provide reasonable procedures, consistent with ap-
plicable international human rights law’.
Arguably, the Security Council cannot go beyond this type of state-
ment and cannot clarify detailed questions on the substance of specific 
rights at the level of its maritime resolutions. Yet, a firmer statement that 
international human rights law indeed applies to any type of enforcement 
measure taken at sea would certainly make it more difficult for states to 
easily depart from well-established standards by a simple reference to 
‘operational constraints’ or similarly vague reasoning. 
E. The referential approach: any added value or pure symbolism?
It has been shown that the Security Council’s reference to ‘appli-
cable’ international human rights law as a stricture on the enforcement 
powers authorized in the respective maritime resolutions is loaded with 
uncertainty. This raises the question whether such reference has any add-
ed value – or could it be left away altogether? 
In this context, it is in order to recall that the maritime resolutions 
under consideration were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter. They are thus decisions within the meaning of Article 25 UN Char-
ter, which has at least two implications: first, such decisions are binding 
upon Member States54 and they are obliged to carry them out;55 second, 
such resolutions are ‘obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter’ in the sense of Article 103 UN Charter and 
thus prevail – in case of conflict – over ‘obligations under any other in-
ternational agreements’, notably international human rights law.56 Var-
ious commentators argue that such conflict not only exists if a state is 
bound by two contradictory obligations, but also covers incompatibility 
between obligations and permissions. Hence, it covers situations where 
the Security Council authorizes states under Chapter VII of the Charter 
53 UNSC Res 1976 (11 April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1976, para 14.
54 Anne Peters, ‘Article 25’ in Simma and others, vol I (n 5) 792, para 8 and 793, 
para 11. 
55 ibid 795, para 18.
56 ibid 850-51, paras 200-01.
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to take enforcement measures rather than obliging them to do so.57 As a 
consequence, one could argue that, by virtue of Article 103 UN Charter, 
the human rights obligations of a state step back if they are not compati-
ble with the taking of ‘all necessary means’ to suppress a specific criminal 
phenomenon by that state based upon a maritime resolution. 
By its reference to applicable international human rights law, the 
Security Council put a stop to that undesirable result for at least two 
reasons. First, the Security Council would hardly refer to the applicable 
international human rights law if it deemed it to be in principle inappli-
cable as a result of the conflict rule enshrined in Article 103 UN Charter. 
Second, and more importantly, by requesting respect of the applicable 
international human rights law in the resolution itself, a state’s obligation 
to respect its treaty obligations becomes part of the resolution and is thus 
an ‘obligation[] of the Members of the United Nations under the present 
Charter’ – and is no longer simply an ‘obligation[] under any other inter-
national agreement’.58 
In sum, the Council’s references to applicable international human 
rights law do not add a layer of protection and do not clarify the many 
open questions relating to the applicability of human rights in maritime 
enforcement operations. However, by equipping its authorizations with a 
reference to applicable international human rights law, the Council pre-
vents a potential conflict between such authorization and states’ human 
rights obligations, which otherwise – in application of Article 103 UN 
Charter – would potentially be solved in favour of unlimited enforcement 
action at sea. 
III. Human rights of victims: a mirroring approach
In the previous part, the focus was on traditional function of human 
rights as a stricture on state (enforcement) action. We now turn to a more 
recently developed facet of human rights law: positive obligations that 
place a duty to take action upon states.59 At the example of assistance 
57 Ibid 850-851, para 201; Andreas Paulus and Johann Ruben Leiss, ‘Article 
103’ in Simma and others, vol II (n 5) 2122, para 31.
58 Art 103 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into 
force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter). 
59 See generally Shelton and Gould (n 6) and Akandji-Kombe (n 7).
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to victims, the following will examine the stance taken by the Security 
Council, if any, vis-à-vis positive obligations. 
It will be demonstrated that the Security Council pursues a mirror-
ing approach: its pronouncements on assistance to victims of maritime 
criminality by states largely reflect international (human rights) law on 
the matter as its stands. For the time being, international law does not 
protect victims of transnational crimes equally. Absent an instrument 
governing assistance to victims of transnational crime specifically, it is 
necessary to revert back to the various legal instruments governing the 
suppression of various crimes committed (also) at sea, which vary greatly 
in terms of obligations placed on states to provide assistance to victims. 
Of the crimes under consideration here, assistance to victims of human 
trafficking is, comparatively speaking, heavily regulated, followed closely 
by assistance to smuggled migrants. The legal instruments relevant to the 
suppression of piracy, however, lack a human rights dimension and are 
thus silent on the matter.
A. UN Protocols on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: fol-
lowing a rights-based approach
We start with an offence addressed by the Security Council in its 
maritime resolutions and for which the legal framework relating to vic-
tim assistance is, comparatively speaking,60 well-developed: trafficking in 
human beings. The UN Protocol on Human Trafficking61 – the primary 
and most specific instrument aimed at suppressing the offence of human 
60 In this article, the various legal instruments relevant to suppressing crimes 
addressed in maritime resolutions are compared in terms of victims’ assistance. Even 
if an instrument, such as the UN Protocol on Trafficking, ranks high, it does not 
mean that victim assistance is in absolute terms bold. Article 6 of the UN Protocol 
on Trafficking, for example, which sets out the various obligations of states vis-à-
vis victims is not throughout formulated in a very compelling fashion; paragraph 1, 
for example, starts with the words ‘In appropriate cases and to the extent possible 
under its domestic law (…)’, and paragraph 5 uses the words ‘Each State Party shall 
endeavour to provide (…)’.
61 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 De-
cember 2003) 2237 UNTS 319 (UN Protocol on Human Trafficking).
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trafficking62 – mentions victims’ assistance prominently in its purpose ar-
ticle,63 while Article 6 specifies the type of assistance owed to victims by 
state parties.64 
The UN Protocol is the first instrument dealing with human traffick-
ing specifically to adopt a rights-based approach. A clear victim dimen-
sion was absent in predecessor treaties, which almost exclusively focused 
on criminalization of trafficking. The Convention for the Suppression of 
the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Oth-
ers of 1949 – concluded in the wake of the UN General Assembly’s adop-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 – invoked 
human dignity in its preamble but otherwise followed the tradition of 
earlier treaties concentrating on the repression of the crime. It was only 
due to the concurrence of several key developments that led to the intro-
duction of a rights-based victim component in instruments dealing with 
human trafficking: the adoption of major human rights treaties (notably 
the two UN Covenants and the ECHR), the progressive conceptualiza-
tion and specification of positive human rights obligations by treaty bod-
ies, and the recognition that human rights may apply extraterritorially.65 
As a result, instruments on human trafficking, which were adopted 
rather recently, feature a victim component and contain specific provi-
sions devoted to victim assistance. This holds true, as mentioned, for 
the UN Protocol on Trafficking of 15 November 2000, but also for the 
UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography of 25 May 
2000,66 and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Traf-
62 UNSC Res 2380, preambular para 5.
63 Art 2(b) UN Protocol on Human Trafficking.
64 Art 6 UN Protocol on Human Trafficking.
65 On the historical evolution of the legal framework on trafficking and how 
it became increasingly human rights-based, see John Cerone, ‘Human Trafficking’, 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (March 2007) <http://opil.
ouplaw.com/home/epil> accessed 1 November 2017, paras 13-30, and Roza Pati, 
‘States’ Positive Obligations with Respect to Human Trafficking: The European 
Court of Human Rights Breaks New Ground in Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia’ (2011) 
29 Boston University International Law Journal 79, 104-126. See also OHCHR, 
‘Human Rights and Human Trafficking’ (Factsheet no. 36, 2014) <www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/FS36_en.pdf> accessed 1 November 2017, 7-8 (on the 
rights-based approach to trafficking pursued today) and 9-53 (specifying the various 
(positive) obligations of states vis-à-vis victims of trafficking).
66 Arts 8 and 9 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
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ficking in Human Beings of 16 May 2005.67 The OHCHR has gone so far 
as to conclude that ‘an international consensus has developed around the 
need for a rights-based approach to trafficking’.68
In its resolutions on Libya, the Security Council not only address-
es the offence of human trafficking, but also the (arguably even more 
relevant) offence of migrant smuggling.69 The UN Protocol on Migrant 
Smuggling of 15 November 2000, the primary legal instrument to ad-
dress the phenomenon, is also rooted in a rights-based approach. Similar 
to the instruments dealing with trafficking in human beings, the UN Pro-
tocol on Migrant Smuggling mentions assistance to victims in its purpose 
article,70 and sets out in Article 16 specific obligations of states in relation 
to victims’ assistance.71 The UN Model Law against the Smuggling of 
Migrants provides further guidance for states on the content and mean-
ing of the various obligations set out in Article 16 of the UN Protocol on 
Migrant Smuggling.72
One may argue that the obligations on states vis-à-vis victims of hu-
man trafficking and migrant smuggling are not formulated in a particu-
larly compelling fashion and leave considerable leeway for states – and 
there is some truth in it.73 Yet, compared with the legal instruments rele-
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (adopted 25 May 
2000, entered into force 18 January 2002) 2171 UNTS 227.
67 Art 1 (stating the purposes of the Convention, which are notably ‘to protect 
the human rights of the victims of trafficking’ and to ‘design a comprehensive frame-
work for the protection and assistance of victims and witnesses’), and Arts 12 and 18 
(specifying obligations in relation to assistance to victims) of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (adopted 16 May 2005, 
entered into force 1 February 2008) CETS 197.
68 OHCHR (n 65) 7-8.
69 In UNSC Res 2240, preambular para 5, the Security Council stresses that 
these are distinct crimes.
70 Art 2 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Im-
plementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 28 January 2004) 2241 UNTS 507 
(UN Protocol on Migrant Smuggling).
71 Art 16 Protocol on Migrant Smuggling; see also Anne T. Gallagher and Fiona 
David, The International Law of Migrant Smuggling (CUP 2014) 556-59.
72 UNODC, ‘Model Law against the Smuggling of Migrants’ (2010) Chapter 
III: Protection and assistance measures <www.unodc.org/documents/human-traf-
ficking/Model_Law_Smuggling_of_Migrants_10-52715_Ebook.pdf> accessed 1 
November 2017.
73 See above, footnote 60.
64 ANNA PETRIG
vant for the suppression of piracy (most notably the UNCLOS, the SUA 
Convention, and the Hostage Convention), which are silent on victims 
of the respective crimes, the UN Protocols nevertheless exhibits such a 
dimension.
B. Legal instruments on the suppression of piracy: lacking a human 
rights dimension
For the suppression of Somali-based piracy, a wide range of legal in-
struments are relevant. The primary legal framework is the UNCLOS,74 
yet its provisions on piracy do not contain human rights considerations 
despite being adopted in the 1982 – that is, at a time when the idea of 
law enforcement powers being restricted by human rights was already 
quite well-established.75 Considering that not even negative obligations 
of states under human rights law found their way into the counter-piracy 
provisions of the UNCLOS, it should not come as a surprise that it is also 
silent on positive obligations of states vis-à-vis victims of piracy.
There are two further instruments of relevance given the modus ope-
randi of Somali-based pirates – the SUA Convention of 198876 and the 
Hostage Convention of 1979 – both of which are silent on the victims 
of the offences they define.77 The only insinuation to individual rights 
is found in Article 7(3) SUA Convention and Article 6 Hostage Con-
vention granting suspects a right to consular assistances similar to Ar-
ticle 36(1) VCCR.78 Article 16(5) UN Protocol on Migrant Smuggling 
requests states to comply with its obligations under the VCCR in cases of 
detention of a victim of migrant smuggling. Yet, such a provision would 
74 Arts 100-107 and Art 110 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 
3 (UNCLOS); this is also the view of the Security Council, see UNSC Res 1846, 
preambular para 4.
75 On why this may be the case, see Petrig (n 31) 225.
76 UNSC Res 1846, para 15.
77 Art 3 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation (adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 
1678 UNTS 221 (SUA Convention); and Art 1 International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages (adopted 17 November 1979, entered into force 3 June 1983) 
1316 UNTS 205 (Hostage Convention).
78 On whether these provisions apply to persons arrested and detained at sea: 
Petrig (n 31) 310-12. 
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not make sense in the context of piracy, where victims are generally not 
detained by the intercepting state. 
In sum, the SUA and Hostage Conventions lack a victim dimension. 
This can arguably be explained by the fact that both the Hostage and 
SUA Conventions are instruments dealing with terrorist offences. And – 
somewhat surprisingly – until today, there is no international instrument79 
defining the status of victims of terrorism.80 There is no explicit reference 
to the right of victims of terrorism in any of the 19 counter-terrorism 
conventions and protocols negotiated by the UN;81 not even the Draft 
Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism fills this ob-
vious gap in international law.82 While some progress is being made in 
this regard, it largely takes the form of soft law guidelines.83
Overall, victims of Somali-based piracy are not addressed in the in-
ternational instruments that the Security Council deems of particular 
79 An exception constitutes a regional instrument: Council of Europe Conven-
tion on the Prevention of Terrorism (adopted 16 May 2005, entered into force 1 
June 2007) CETS 196. It contains a provision on the protection, compensation and 
support for victims (Art 13); however, a state owes assistance only to ‘victims of 
terrorism that has been committed within its own territory’ (emphasis added). Argu-
ably, this includes victims of maritime terrorism. See also Directive (EU) 2017/541 of 
the European Parliament and the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism 
and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council 
Decision 2005/671/JHA, paras 27-30, which states that Member States should, inter 
alia, adopt measures of protection, support and assistance responding to the needs 
of terrorism victims and their family members; assist with victims’ compensation 
claims; ensure a comprehensive response to the needs of terrorism victims; and ‘en-
sure that all victims of terrorism have access to information about victims’ rights, 
available support services and compensation schemes in the Member State where the 
terrorist offence was committed’.
80 Theo Van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public In-
ternational Law (August 2007) <http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil> accessed 1 
November 2017, para 18. See, e.g., Carlos Fernàndez de Casadevante Romani, In-
ternational Law of Victims (Springer 2012) 82-83 (discussing ‘a lack of a concept of 
“victim of terrorism”’).
81 UNODC, ‘Good Practices in Supporting Victims of Terrorism within the 
Criminal Justice Framework’ (2005) 5 <www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Pub-
lications/Good%20practices%20on%20victims/good_practices_victims_E.pdf> 
accessed 1 November 2017.
82 Draft Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism (2005) UN 
Doc A/59/894, Appendix II. 
83 See the UNODC’s ‘Good Practices in Supporting Victims of Terrorism with-
in the Criminal Justice Framework’ (n 81).
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relevance: the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention, and the Hostage Con-
vention. As a consequence, obligations of states to assist victims of pi-
racy – notably hostages – can only be based on general international 
human rights treaties. So far, however, international courts and bodies 
have had limited opportunity to set out what measures states must take 
vis-à-vis victims of maritime criminality specifically. The Djibouti Code 
of Conduct, which mentions assistance to victims of illegal activities at 
sea among its purposes, does not clarify what kind of assistance is owed 
to victims of piracy because it refers to assistance ‘[c]onsistent with (...) 
applicable rules of international law’.84 By referring to applicable interna-
tional law – which is silent as regards victims of piracy specifically – the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct does not provide much guidance.85 
It has briefly been demonstrated that international law protects vic-
tims of crimes to varying degrees, depending on the offence committed 
against them. Looking at the offences relevant in the Security Council’s 
maritime resolutions, it is palpable that the legal framework on assistance 
to victims of human trafficking is best equipped, followed by that on 
migrant smuggling. Both instruments are clearly based on a rights-based 
approach and list assistance to victims among their purposes. Meanwhile, 
the rights of victims of Somali-based piracy – that is, victims of the crimes 
defined in the SUA and/or Hostage Conventions or fulfilling the defi-
nition of piracy set out in Article 101 UNCLOS – do not find explicit 
mention in these instruments.
C. Maritime resolutions reflect the lex lata
The maritime resolutions of the Security Council reflect the differ-
ences in international law regarding the state’s obligation to assist victims 
of crime. As regards victims of violence against ships and crew, which 
qualify as piracy or maritime terrorism offences, the Security Council 
pursues a very cautious approach. In the preamble of its 2016 resolu-
tion on Somali-based piracy, the Council stressed ‘the need for States 
to consider possible methods to assist the seafarers who are victims of 
pirates’; however, such language is noticeably absent from the 2017 suc-
84 Art 2(1)(d) The Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct 2017 
(emphasis added) (DCoC 2017).
85 See Art 5(3), read together with Art 2(1)(d), DCoC 2017.
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cessor resolution, which nevertheless commends various international 
actors, notably the International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Net-
work (ISWAN) and the CGPCS Piracy Survivors Family Fund (PSFF), 
for their work in victim assistance.86 And the operative parts of both the 
2016 and 2017 resolutions call upon all states ‘to render assistance by, 
among other actions, providing disposition and logistics assistance with 
respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such as victims, 
witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted un-
der this resolution’.87 Vagueness in terms of the type of assistance to be 
provided (‘disposition and logistics assistance’) and restraint regarding 
the level of commitment (a call ‘to consider possible methods to assist’) 
resonate not only with this latest resolution on Somali-based piracy but 
also with all predecessor resolutions. A reference to a potential legal 
obligation of states to assist victims of Somali-based piracy is not to be 
found in these resolutions. In sum, the Security Council does not frame 
assistance to victims of Somali-based piracy as legal obligations of states. 
Hence, the Security Council simply mirrors international law, which ex-
hibits a gap in terms of assistance to victims of (maritime) terrorism and 
piracy specifically.88 
By contrast, the Security Council takes a bolder stance as regards vic-
tims of human trafficking and migrant smuggling by referring to the legal 
obligations of states to assist victims of these crimes taking place (at least 
partly) at sea. This accrues from the following preambular paragraph 
shared by all three resolutions relating to migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking through and from Libya: ‘Bearing in mind the obligations of 
States under applicable international law (…) to identify and provide 
effective assistance to victims of trafficking and migrants’.89 In the opera-
tive part of the resolutions, the Security Council urges Member States to 
render ‘assistance to migrants and victims of human trafficking recovered 
86 UNSC Res 2316 (9 November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2316, preambular para 
27; UNSC Res 2383, preambular para 27. 
87 UNSC Res 2316, para 18; same language in UNSC Res 2383, para 18.
88 General international human rights treaties may entail positive obligations 
of states to assist victims of piracy; however, it is far from clear what they exactly 
encompass. See also Sofia Galani, ‘Somali Piracy and the Human Rights of Seafarers’ 
(2016) 34 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 71, 77-82 (discussing the human 
rights obligations of states and the human rights gaps in counter-piracy operations). 
89 UNSC Res 2380, preambular para 24; identical wording in UNSC Res 2312, 
preambular para 24, and UNSC Res 2240, preambular para 23.
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at sea, in accordance with international law’.90 Similar to the negative 
dimension of human rights,91 the Security Council simply refers to the 
applicable international law (referential approach) and does not bring to 
bear its own standard in terms of positive obligations of states vis-à-vis 
victims of human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Yet, compared with 
its resolutions on Somali-based piracy, the Security Council recognizes 
that specific legal obligations of states towards victims of crimes commit-
ted by traffickers and smugglers of human beings exist. It thus mirrors 
the international legal landscape on victim assistance and the fact that 
state obligations towards victims of these two offences are regulated in a 
(comparatively) detailed manner in binding legal instruments.
Overall, in its maritime resolutions, the Security Council mirrors in-
ternational law on assistance to victims of crimes as it stands – rather than 
setting its own standard by requesting (or at least urging) states to assist 
victims in a certain way. By simply mirroring existing international law on 
victim assistance, the Security Council perpetuates the disparities and in-
equalities this body of law carries and fails to level the (hardly justifiable) 
differences between victims of different transnational crimes. Hence, the 
Security Council does not actively contribute to the progressive recogni-
tion of victims’ rights on the international plane, but merely reflects this 
development, which goes hand in hand with the trend in international 
law to perceive individuals not as mere objects but as subjects with cer-
tain rights and duties.92
90 UNSC Res 2380, para 3; similar wording in UNSC Res 2312, para 3; and 
UNSC Res 2240, para 3. The French text makes it clear that the Council urges States 
to render assistance (and not only to cooperate in providing assistance): ‘Demande 
instamment aux États Membres et aux organismes régionaux de coopérer avec le 
Gouvernement d’entente nationale et entre eux dans un esprit de solidarité interna-
tionale et de responsabilité partagée, notamment en échangeant des informations sur 
les actes de trafic de migrants et de traite d’êtres humains dans les eaux territoriales 
libyennes et en haute mer au large des côtes libyennes, et de venir en aide aux mi-
grants et aux victimes de la traite d’êtres humains secourus en mer, conformément 
au droit international’.
91 See above, Part II.
92 See Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity 
and Change in International Law (CUP 2011) 343: ‘The shift from a system which 
conceived of individuals as mere objects to a system in which individuals have a cer-
tain status and capacity has been traced in Part (…)’. 
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IV. Conclusion: why no bolder role?
The contribution at hand was devoted to examining the role the Se-
curity Council accords to human rights in its maritime resolutions. The 
result is rather sobering: the Security Council mentions human rights in 
its resolutions dealing with illegal acts committed at sea, be it breaches of 
embargos, human trafficking, migrant smuggling or piracy. However, as 
regards the negative dimension of human rights law – that is, a state’s duty 
to respect human rights when taking (enforcement) action – the Security 
Council merely references the applicable international human rights law. 
It has been demonstrated that this referential approach is problematic 
because the issue of applicability of human rights in the maritime context 
is fraught with uncertainty. As regards states’ positive obligations, the ex-
ample of assistance to victims of maritime criminality has shown that the 
Security Council resolutions simply reflect international (human rights) 
law as it stands. By and large, the Security Council refrains from setting 
its own human rights standard that would apply to states engaging in law 
enforcement operations authorized by the maritime resolutions.
This finding prompts the question of why the Security Council shows 
such restraint and does not act in a bolder way to strengthen the human 
rights regime at sea? One may argue that – within the sharing of compe-
tences between the different organs of the United Nations – the realiza-
tion of human rights is the responsibility of the General Assembly rather 
than the Security Council.93 Yet, the Security Council, when carrying out 
its primary function, which is the maintenance of international peace and 
security,94 must act in accordance with the purposes and principles en-
shrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter.95 Article 1(3) UN Charter 
lists the achievement of international cooperation ‘in promoting and en-
couraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom’ among 
the purposes; while the protection of human rights today amounts to a 
principle, which the Security Council must respect.96 Hence, the Security 
Council is not only allowed but rather obliged to give human rights due 
93 See, e.g., Art 13(1)(b) UN Charter.
94 Art 24(1) UN Charter.
95 Art 24(2) UN Charter.
96 Peters (n 54) 789, MN 57 [citing Evelyne Lagrange, ‘Le Conseil de Sécurité 
peut-il violer le droit international?’ (2004) 2 RBDI 568-91, 570].
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weight when enforcing peace and security – for example, through resolu-
tions granting enforcement powers to suppress illicit acts at seas.
A better explanation of why the Security Council keeps such a low 
profile in terms of human rights in its maritime resolutions may be that it 
is nothing more than the long arm of (certain) states. Admittedly, it can 
be argued that the Security Council is an independent organ, which acts 
on behalf of a legal person (the UN) and not on behalf of the members 
of which the organ is composed.97 Yet, it seems too legalist an approach 
to ignore the members composing the organ.98 The attitude of states rep-
resented permanently or temporarily in the Security Council will (to a 
greater or lesser extent) always shimmer through in the Council’s actions. 
Hence, the fact that within most states, the concept of human rights in 
the maritime context is still in its infancy – a concept not yet firmly an-
chored and just slowly gaining acceptance and its contours in the last 
decade – will show through in the Security Council.
The example of France, one of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council, is illustrative in this respect. In its preliminary obser-
vations in the Medvedyev case before the European Court of Human 
Rights, France stressed that arrest and detention ‘had taken place on the 
high sea, so that it was necessary to take into account the specificities of 
the maritime environment and of navigation at sea’. It further argued that 
‘for want of any provisions in the Convention (...) concerning maritime 
matters’ the ECHR is inapplicable ratione materiae.99 In the alternative, 
it suggested ‘that freedom to come and go on board a ship has more re-
strictive limits, which were the confines of the ship itself’ and, therefore, 
holding persons on board a ship does not amount to deprivation of liber-
ty.100 Not even one year after the final decision of this case by the Grand 
Chamber, France enacted a law pertaining to counter-piracy operations 
and the exercise of enforcement powers at sea – a rather exemplary law 
that grants various procedural rights to suspects deprived of their liberty 
at sea and in which France clearly takes a human rights-based approach 
to law enforcement at sea.101
97 ibid 776, MN 45.
98 ibid 776, MN 46.
99 Medvedyev and Others v France App no 3394/03 (Grand Chamber, ECtHR, 
29 March 2010) para 49.
100 ibid para 50.
101 Loi français n° 2011-13 du 5 janvier 2011 relative à la lutte contre la pirate-
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The example of France demonstrates that the concept of human 
rights at sea needs to be further explored, specified and consolidated 
– this holds true even for states known for their human rights abidance 
in domestic and land-based law enforcement operations. Once the idea 
that human rights apply anywhere the state takes action – be it at land 
or at sea – gains ground at the state level, the likelihood grows that the 
Security Council will accord a bolder role to human rights in its maritime 
resolutions. 
rie et à l’exercise des pouvoirs de police en l’Etat de mer (2011) (Loi français n° 
2011-13); on the content of the whole act, see Luc Briand, ‘Lutte contre la piraterie 
maritime: la France renforce son arsenal législatif. À propos de la loi n° 2011-13 du 5 
janvier 2011 relative à la lutte contre la piraterie et à l’exercice des pouvoirs de police 
en l’État en mer’ [2011] Gazette du Palais 8, 8. In English: Petrig (n 31) 120-21.
